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Abstract
Autonomous neural systems must efficiently process information in a wide
range of novel environments, which may have very different statistical prop-
erties. We consider the problem of how to optimally distribute receptors
along a one-dimensional continuum consistent with the following design prin-
ciples. First, neural representations of the world should obey a neural un-
certainty principle—making as few assumptions as possible about the statis-
tical structure of the world. Second, neural representations should convey,
as much as possible, equivalent information about environments with differ-
ent statistics. The results of these arguments resemble the structure of the
visual system and provide a natural explanation of the behavioral Weber-
Fechner law, a foundational result in psychology. Because the derivation is
extremely general, this suggests that similar scaling relationships should be
observed not only in sensory continua, but also in neural representations of
“cognitive’ one-dimensional quantities such as time or numerosity.
The adapatability of mammals, humans in particular, to many novel environments
has been one of the keys to our evolutionary success. This flexibility is made possible, among
other things, by the ability of the sensory systems to represent information efficiently in
a wide range of circumstances. For instance, consider the differing demands on the visual
system in a desert, or a dense forest, or an office environment (Torralba & Oliva, 2003).
One evolutionary strategy would be to adapt the properties of the sensors to a particular
environment, or a particular stimulus. The “fly detectors” in the frog’s brain described by
Maturana and colleagues provides an early example of this reasoning (Lettvin, Maturana,
McCulloch, & Pitts, 1959; Maturana, Lettvin, McCulloch, & Pitts, 1960). However, if the
efficiency of the visual system depended critically on the statistics of a particular visual
environment, it would leave the organism at a disadvantage if it moved to a different envi-
ronment, or if the environment changed. Of course, these considerations do not only apply
to vision; analogous arguments can be made for other sensory modalities and even neural
representation of more abstract quantities, such as time or numerosity. This suggests a
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Figure 1.
Physiological measurements of receptive field size in macaque. (a) Receptive field size
(diameter) as a function of receptive field center (eccentricity) for visual areas V1, V2, and
V4. Data adapted from Gattass et al. (1981) and Gattass et al. (1988), the only studies to
measure receptive fields in all three macaque ventral stream areas with comparable methods.
The size-to-eccentricity relationship in each area is well described by a “hinged” line (see
Supplementary Methods for details and an analysis of a larger set of ten physiological data
sets). (b) Cartoon depiction of receptive fields with sizes based on physiological
measurements. The center of each array is the fovea. The size of each circle is proportional
to its eccentricity, based on the corresponding scaling parameter (slope of the fitted line in
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Figure 1. a. Weber-Fechner law can be generated from receptive fields that are of equal width and
density as a function of log x. This results in receptive fields that increase in width and decrease in
density as a function of x. The increase in receptive field width should go up linearly with x; the
density should go down like 1/x. The spacing of adjacent receptors should be a constant ratio for
all values of x. b. Width of visual receptive fields as a function of eccentricity in three regions of
macaque visual cortex. The “fovea” can be seen as a region of constant spacing (flat line) near an
eccentricity of zero. There is a linear relationship outside of the fovea for all three regions. Figure
taken from Freeman & Simoncelli (2011) who performed a metaanalysis on empirical studies cited
therein.
design principle for the brain: the structure of neural epr sentatio should make as few
assumptions as possible about the statistical structure f t e wor d, whic one might call a
neural uncertainty principle, and convey, as much as possible equivalent information about
environments with different statistics, which one might call a neural equanimity principle.
We will argue in this paper that the Weber-Fechner law (Fechner, 1860/1912), the
observation that the change in the perceptual magnitude of many one-dimensional quan-
tities1 depends on the relative, rather than absolute change in the physical quantity, can
be understood as a behavioral manifestation of these design principles. The psychological
scales of physical dimensions x obeying the Weber-Fechner law are logarithmic. In the brain
some external scalar quantities, such as weight and luminance, may be expressed simply as
the intensity of the response of a single receptor. This paper is concerned with variables,
such as extrafoveal retinal position, that are expressed by a distributed pattern of firing
across a set of receptors (which Stevens, 1957 referred to as metathetic variables). Each
receptor is associated with a receptive field, which describes the response of the receptor
to a constant stimulus with a particular value x. Each receptor responds to stimuli in a
circumscribed range of values of x; the array of all receptors can thus represent functions
over x, f(x) (Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006). In this paper we study how to optimally
distribute receptors in order to represent arbitrary unknown functions in the world. Before
formalizing this problem, we make some simple mathematical observations about logarith-
mic scaling of receptors and then briefly review the evidence that the visual system does
(and does not) utilize this form of neural scaling.
1The Weber-Fechner law does not apply to circular variables, such as head direction or orientation.
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Logarithmic neural scales
Receptive fields that are evenly-spaced and of equal width on a logarithmic scale
(Fig. 1a, top) lead naturally to the Weber-Fechner perceptual law. A logarithmic scale
implies several properties of the receptive fields (Fig. 1a bottom). A logarithmic scale implies
that there should be fewer receptive fields centered at high values of x, and receptors coding
for higher values of x should have wider receptive fields. These qualitative impressions can
be refined to several quantitatively precise relationships. If the receptive fields are evenly-
spaced on a logarithmic axis then the width of receptive fields centered on a value x should
go up proportional to x. More generally, if the ith receptor has a receptive field centered
on xi, then the shape of the receptive field should be constant for all receptors, but the
width of the receptive field should scale with the value of xi. If we denote the center of the
ith cells receptive field as xi and define ∆i ≡ xi − xi−1, then a logarithmic scale implies
that the ratio of adjacent receptors, ∆i+i/∆i, is a constant for all values of i.
2 Finally we
note that because log 0 is not finite, a logarithmic scale with a finite number of receptors
cannot continue to x = 0. In practice, this means that if the brain makes use of logarithmic
scales, there must be some other consideration for values near zero. In fact, as we will see
below, the brain appears to solve this problem in the visual system by including a region
of approximately constant receptor spacing for small x (note the flat region around zero in
Fig. 1b).
Logarithmic neural scales in the mammalian brain
There is strong evidence that the visual system in mammals obeys logarithmic scaling
in representing extrafoveal retinal position. In monkeys, both the spacing of receptive fields
(the cortical magnification factor) (Daniel & Whitteridge, 1961; Hubel & Wiesel, 1974;
Van Essen, Newsome, & Maunsell, 1984; Gattass, Sousa, & Gross, 1988) and the width
of receptive fields (Hubel & Wiesel, 1974; Gattass et al., 1988; Schwartz, 1977) obey the
quantitative relationships specified by logarithmic scaling to a good degree of approximation
outside of the fovea. Figure 1b (reproduced from Freeman & Simoncelli, 2011) shows
receptive field width in the macaque across several cortical regions. The fovea is visible as
a region of constant receptive field width, followed by a much larger region showing a linear
relationship between field width and eccentricity, consistent with logarithmic scaling. If the
curves obeyed logarithmic scaling precisely, the lines would continue to the origin rather
than flattening out in the fovea. However, because the spacing between receptors would go
to zero, this would require an infinite number of receptors.
In the case of vision, logarithmic scaling can ultimately be attributed to the distribu-
tions of receptors along the surface of the retina. However, this logarithmic mapping may
be more general, extending to other sensory (Merzenich, Knight, & Roth, 1973) and motor
maps (Schwartz, 1977). In addition, evidence suggests that logarithmic scaling holds for
variables that are not associated with any sensory organ. Neural evidence from monkeys
and humans (Nieder & Miller, 2003; Harvey, Klein, Petridou, & Dumoulin, 2013) suggests
2Note that while logarithmic scaling implies a constant ratio of adjacent receptor spacings, the converse
is not true. For instance, if the ratio of receptor spacings was one, this would not lead to logarithmic scaling.
Similarly, if we took a set of receptors on a logarithmic scale and added a constant to each one, the ratio
∆i+1/∆i would be unchanged and remain constant with respect to i whereas xi+1/xi would no longer be
constant with respect to i.
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that neural representations of non-verbal numerosity are arranged on a logarithmic scale,
consistent with a broad range of behavioral studies of non-verbal mathematical cognition
(Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 2004). Behavioral and theoret-
ical work (Balsam & Gallistel, 2009; Howard, Shankar, Aue, & Criss, 2015) suggests that
a similar form of logarithmic scaling could also apply to representations of time, which is
qualitatively consistent with growing body of neurophysiological evidence from “time cells”
in the hippocampus, entorhinal cortex, and striatum (Salz et al., 2016; Kraus et al., 2015;
Mello, Soares, & Paton, 2015). The neurophysiological evidence that these “cognitive”
variables use logarithmic scaling is not nearly as well-quantified as visual receptive fields.
Overview
If a set of receptors was optimized under the expectation of a particular form of statis-
tics in the world, it would be suboptimal, perhaps disastrous, if the organism encountered a
state of the world with very different statistics. The next section (“Optimal receptor distri-
bution. . . ”) considers the problem of optimally placing receptors to represent an unknown
arbitrary function from a local perspective. The result of this section is that for all receptors
to convey the same amount of information as their neighbors, receptor spacings should be
in a constant ratio. The following section (“Global function representation”) considers the
amount of information conveyed by a set of receptors about a function controlled by some
fixed, but unknown, scale. The global organization that leads to equivalent information for
a wide range of scales has a region of constant spacing (ratio 1) followed by a region with
constant ratio spacing (ratio > 1) which resembles the organization of the visual system
with a closely-packed fovea surrounded by a logarithmic scale.
Optimal receptor distribution for representing arbitrary unknown
functions
We want to represent a function in the world over some continuous real value x.
Receptors sample the function in some neighborhood such that each receptor is “centered”
on a particular value of x. The goal is to distribute the receptors to enable them to represent
an arbitrary and unknown function f(x). In order for this problem to be meaningful we
must assume that there is a finite number of receptors. We assume here that the lower and
upper bounds of the scale x are physically constrained. At the lower bound, perhaps there
is some minimal degree of resolution that can be achieved with the receptors. In some cases
the upper bound may be given by the properties of the world or anatomy. For instance,
in vision, ecccentricity cannot possibly be larger than pi. Our question, then is how to
distribute the location of the receptors within the range of x values to be represented.
Each additional receptor provides an additional benefit to the organism to the extent
that it provides additional information about the function. Intuitively, if we clumped all
of the receptors close together this would be suboptimal, because the receptors would all
be conveying the same information and there would be no receptors to communicate infor-
mation about other regions of the function. Naively, we might expect that the solution is
trivial—perhaps receptors should be evenly-spaced along the x-axis. It will turn out that
this is not in general the optimal solution. Rather, the spacing of each pair of receptors
should be in a constant ratio to the spacing of the previous pair of receptors. Constant
spacing corresponds to a ratio of 1; it will turn out that other ratios are admissable as well.
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Figure 2. a. Discretizing the function. After picking some small resolution (“jnd” in the figure),
we discretize the signal. This defines a variable s(x) describing the distance (or scale) between x
and the next location where the function takes on a different discretized value. b. Schematic for
notation. The derivation assumes that there are receptors at xi−1 and xi separated by ∆i. The
goal is to choose ∆i+1 (and thus xi+1) such that the redundancy between the pairs of receptors is
equated.
In order to do the calculation we need to measure the redundancy between a pair of
receptors. There are a number of measures of redundancy one might use. For instance, we
might measure the mutual information between the output of two receptors after observing
the world for some period of time. There are other measures that one might use. All
things equal, we would expect the redundancy between two receptors to be higher for
receptors that are placed close together rather than receptors that are placed far apart. The
development below applies to any measure of redundancy that obeys some basic properties.3
The distribution of receptors is optimal if each receptor is expected to be as redundant with
its predecessor as it is with its successor. If that was not the case, then we could move one
of the receptors and get more non-redundant information out about the function.
Formulation of the problem
Suppose we have set of receptors with receptive fields centered on positions x1, x2,
. . .xN . As before, let us denote the distance between the locations of receptor xi−1 and xi
as ∆i. Constant receptor spacing would imply that ∆i = ∆i+1 for all i. It will turn out
that this is not the general solution to our problem. Rather, the solution is to space the
receptors such that the ratio of adjacent receptor spacings is a constant across the scale.
That is, the ratio ∆i+1/∆i takes the same value for all i.
3After the general derivation we include a worked example with a particularly tractable measure of
redundancy.
NEURAL SCALING LAWS FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 6
We assume that in the neighborhood of each xi, the function is controlled by some
scale sxi . To quantify this in an unambiguous way, assume that our receptors can only
respond over a finite range with some non-zero resolution. Accordingly, we discretize the
function to be represented to some degree of resolution (Figure 2a) so that at each value
of x, sx gives the distance to the next value of x where the discretized function would take
a different value than the discretized f(x). That is, for each x, the discretized function
f(x) = f(x′) for each x < x′ < x+ sx.
Note that if we knew the scale sxi at xi, it would be straightforward to estimate
the redundancy between the receptor at xi and the receptor at xi+1. If we knew that the
spacing between receptors ∆i+1 were much smaller than sxi , the receptors would measure
the same value and we would expect the redundancy to be high. In contrast, if we knew
that the spacing between the receptors were much smaller than sxi then the value of the
function would have changed at least once between xi and xi+1 and we would expect the
redundancy to be low. Let us denote the function relating the redundancy we would observe
between receptors spaced by a particular value ∆i if we knew the scale took a particular
value s as α(s; ∆i). We assume α(s; ∆i) to be a monotonically decreasing function of its
argument. Note that we could choose any number of different ways to measure redundancy.
For instance, we could treat mutual information as our measure of redundancy and this,
coupled with knowledge of the properties of the receptors, would specify a specific form
for α(s; ∆i). But we could just as well measure redundancy in other ways or assume
different properties of our receptors, which would result in a different form for α(s; ∆i).
The arguments below about optimal receptor spacing apply to any measure of redundancy
that obeys some basic properties described below and does not depend critically on how
one chooses to measure redundancy.
Observing the redundancy between the receptors at xi−1 and xi spaced by ∆i allows
us to infer the value of the scale at the first receptor sxi−1 . For instance, if the redundancy
is maximal, that implies that the function did not change between xi−1 and xi. In contrast,
if the redundancy between the receptors at xi−1 and xi is very small, that implies that the
scale of the function at xi−1, sxi−1 was smaller than ∆i. Knowing the scale at xi−1 places
constraints on the value at xi. For instance, if we knew with certainty that sxi−1 = ∆i +C,
then we would know with certainty that sxi = C. So, if we knew the probability of each
value of sxi−1 this constrains the probability distribution for sxi .
Let us fix the spacing ∆i between the receptors at xi−1 and xi, sample the world
for some time (observing many values of the the receptor outputs in response to many
samples from the function) and denote the average value of redundancy we observe as αobs.
Denoting the (unknown) probability of observing each possible value of sxi−1 as pi−1 (s),
then the observed value of redundancy, αobs, resulted from an integral:
αobs =
∫
pi−1 (s) α(s; ∆i) ds (1)
This can be understood as an inference problem; observation of αobs leads us to some
belief about the distribution pi−1 (s). Informed by this knowledge, we then place the third
receptor at a spacing ∆i+1. If we knew the distribution of scales at xi, pi (s), then we would
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expect to observe a redundancy of
αpred =
∫
pi (s) α(s; ∆i+1) ds (2)
between the second pair of receptors. Our problem is to choose ∆i+1 such that we would
expect αpred = αobs.
Minimal assumptions about the statistical properties of the world
The actual value of ∆i+1 that makes αpred = αobs of course depends on the detailed
properties of the receptors, the function α(s; ∆) and the statistics of the world. We show,
however, that for minimal assumptions about the world, this problem results in the solution
that, whatever the value of αobs one finds that for some spacing ∆i, the choice of ∆i+1 is
such that only ∆i+1/∆i is affected by the observed value αobs.
First, we make minimal assumptions about the function to be estimated. We assume
an uninformative prior for pi−1 (s). We make the minimal assumptions that successive
values of s are independent, and that the value of the function past the sx is independent of
the value at x. That is we assume that f(x) and f(x+ sx) are independent of one another,
as are sx and sx+sx .
4
Second, we require that the receptors do not introduce a scale via α(s; ∆). In general,
the function α(s; ∆) will depend on how we choose to quantify redundancy and the prop-
erties of the receptors. However, as long as α(s; ∆) rescales, such that it can be rewritten
in a canonical form
α(s; ∆) = αˆ(s/∆), (3)
the conclusions in this section will hold. One can readily imagine idealized settings where
Eq. 3 will hold. For instance, we could assume we have perfect receptors that sample the
function at only one point and take our measure of redundancy to be one if the receptors
observe the same value up to the resolution used to specify s (Fig. 2b) and zero otherwise.
More generally, for imperfect receptors that sample a range of values, Eq. 3 requires that
the receptive fields scale up with ∆. This assumption is necessary, but not sufficient to
equate redundancy between receptors.
Our third requirement is referred to as the Copernican principle. Because it is critical
to the argument in this section, we discuss it in some detail in the next subsection.
The Copernican Principle
In addition to minimal assumptions about the statistics of the world and the proper-
ties of the receptors, we assume that the world’s choice of sxi−1 is unaffected by our choice of
∆i. The belief that there is nothing privileged about one’s point of observation is referred
to as the Copernican principle. The Copernican principle was employed by Gott (1993)
to estimate a probability distribution for the duration of human civilization. Because this
4The critical point of these assumptions is that at no point to we introduce an assumption about the
statistics of the world that would fix a scale for our receptors. For instance, the result of receptor spacings
in a constant ratio would also hold if we assumed a power law prior for pi−1 (s) rather than a uniform prior
because the power law is a scale-free distribution. Similarly, it is acceptable to relax the assumption of
independence between f(x) and f(x+ sx) as long as doing so does not introduce a scale.
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provides a concrete illustration of an important concept, it is worth explaining Gott’s logic
in some detail.
Suppose we observe Fenway Park in 2017 and learn it has been standing for 103
years. Knowing nothing about construction techniques or the economics of baseball we
want to estimate how much longer Fenway Park will stand. Because there is nothing
special about our current viewpoint in 2017, our observation of Fenway should be uniformly
distributed across its lifetime. That is, the observation at tnow in 2017 ought to be uniformly
distributed between tstart when Fenway Park was constructed (in 1914) and the unknown
time of its destruction tend. Gott argued that we should expect tnow to be uniformly
distributed between tstart and tend, such that we should expect tend− tnow to be longer than
tnow − tstart half the time. This means that the age of the structure (102 years) fixes the
units of the distribution of tend − tstart. If we observed an object that has been existing for
1030 years, or for 103 seconds, then our inference about its expected duration would have
the same shape, but only differ in the choice of units.
The Copernican argument also applies to our inference problem. Here the scale at the
first receptor sxi−1 plays a role analogous to the duration of the object tend− tstart. Suppose
that we have a set of receptors with a known function α(s; ∆) that obeys Eq. 3 and we
encounter a world with some unknown statistics. In this first world we choose some ∆i,
observe some measure of redundancy αobs, use some method of inference to estimate pi−1 (s)
and pi (s) and then select the value of ∆i+1 to yield the expectation that αpred = αobs. Let
us refer to the distribution of pi (s) that we inferred from fixing ∆i to its particular value and
observing αobs as pα (s; ∆i). Now, suppose that we encounter another world with the same
receptors. Assume further that we choose a different ∆i but observe the same value of αobs.
How should our inference about the distribution of sxi be related to our inference from the
first world? If Eq. 3 holds, the Copernican Principle requires that all of the distributions
that can be inferred for a particular value of αobs must be related to one another via a
canonical form:
pα (s; ∆i) =
1
∆i
pˆα(s/∆i). (4)
If Equation 4 did not hold, it would imply that we can infer something about the world’s
choice of sxi from our choice of ∆i+1 beyond that communicated by the value of αobs. As
long as the receptors and our measure of redundancy scale with ∆i as in Eq. 3 then any such
effect would imply that the world’s choice of s and our choice of ∆i are not independent
and thus violate the Copernican Principle.
Ratio scaling results from minimal assumptions about the statistics of the world and the
Copernican Principle
Equations 3 and 4 imply that redundancy is equated for receptor spacings in some
ratio. To see this, let us rewrite Eq. 2 and find
αpred(∆i+1) =
1
∆i
∫ ∞
0
pˆα (s/∆i) αˆ(∆i+1/s) ds
=
∫ ∞
0
pˆα(s
′) αˆ(r/s′) ds′ (5)
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In the second line s′ ≡ s/∆i and we define the ratio r ≡ ∆i+1/∆i. The right hand side of
Equation 5 clearly does not depend on ∆i+1 directly, but only on the ratio.
The finding, then, is that a principle of minimal assumptions about the statistics of
the world coupled with the Copernican Principle implies that the optimal distribution of
receptor locations is such that the ratio of successive receptor spacings is constant. Loga-
rithmic neural scales also imply that the ratio of successive receptor spacings are constant.
In this sense, logarithmic scales can be understood as a response to the demand that the
receptor layout are expected to equalize redundancy across receptors in a world with un-
known statistics. Because logarithmic scales do not uniquely predict constant ratio spacing
this cannot be the entire story. We pursue additional constraints that imply logarithmic
scales, with some important exceptions when x approaches zero, in the next section. Before
that, for concreteness we include a worked example for a idealized set of receptors and a
specific choice for α(s; ∆).
A worked example
The general development above provides a set of conditions that result in a constant
ratio of spacing between receptors. In order to make this more concrete, we work out a
specific example with specific choices for the properties of the receptors, the measure of
redundancy and the method of inference.
This example assumes that the receptors are perfect and the ith receptor samples the
function only at the location xi. For simplicity we define a measure of redundancy that
gives α = 1 if the two receptors observe the same value of f and α = 0 otherwise. This lets
us write out
α(s; ∆i) =
{
1, if ∆i < sxi−1
0, if ∆i ≥ sxi−1
The same holds for α(s; ∆i+1), only comparing ∆i+1 to sxi . With our simplified definition
of redundancy, any value of αobs that is not zero or one must have resulted from a mixture
of those two cases with probability αobs and 1− αobs respectively. Let us first consider the
case where ∆i < sxi−1 , as it aligns perfectly with the Gott argument.
If sxi−1 > ∆i, then sxi−1 plays the role of the unknown duration of the lifetime of an
object such as Fenway Park, tend− tstart. The difference between the two receptors ∆i plays
the role of the time of the current observation tnow−tstart and the unknown sxi+1 is analogous
to tend − tnow. Gott’s calculation defines the ratio r = (tend − tnow) / (tnow − tstart). The
Copernican Principle leads to the belief that tnow ought to be uniformly distributed between
tstart and tend. Thus the cumulative distribution of r obeys:
P (r > Y ) =
1
1 + Y
(6)
Note that the elapsed duration tnow − tstart only enters this expression via the ratio.
Similar arguments apply to the spacing of receptors. If we observe αobs = 1, then the
posterior pi (s) is controlled by Eq. 6, with ∆i in place of tnow − tstart and ∆i+1 in place
of tend − tnow.5 In this toy problem, the value of αpred is given by Eq. 6 if αobs = 1. If
5That is, Eq. 6 gives the cumulative of the posterior distribution.
NEURAL SCALING LAWS FOR AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 10
instead of αobs = 1, we observed αobs = 0, we would infer a uniform distribution of s(xi).
6
If our prior on the distribution of sxi is uniform, then αpred will be one for any finite value
of ∆i+1.
After sampling the world for some period of time, if we observe αobs as a number
between zero and one, then our posterior distribution of scales should be a mixture of the
inference from the two cases and simplify Eq. 2 as:
αpred(∆i+1) = αobs
1
1 + ∆i+1/∆i
+ (1− αobs) (7)
It is clear that the right hand side is only a function of the ratio r ≡ ∆i+1/∆i so that the
value of ∆i+1 that makes αpred = αobs depends only on the ratio.
7 For any value of αobs,
the same value of r satisfies this equation for any choice of ∆i. In this simple problem
we see that the choice of ∆i can only affect the answer by fixing its units. This naturally
results in the ratio of adjacent receptor spacings being constant, as implied by logarithmic
receptor scales.
Global function representation
The foregoing analysis conducted at the level of pairs of receptors showed that the
optimal spacing in order to represent arbitrary functions places the receptors in constant
ratio, but does not specify the value of the ratio. It is convenient to parameterize the ratio
between adjacent receptors by a parameter c such that r ≡ ∆i+1∆i = 1 + c. If c = 0, receptor
spacing is constant; if c > 0 the ratio is constant, as in a logarithmic scale. We consider the
global coding properties of these two schemes as well as a hybrid scheme in which the first
part of the axis has constant spacing (c = 0) followed by a region with logarithmic spacing
(c > 0), analogous to the organization of the visual system, with the region of constant
spacing corresponding roughly to the fovea (Fig. 1b).
Formulating the problem
For simplicity, we assume that each receptor perfectly samples the value of a function
in the world at a single perfectly-specified location and consider a simple class of functions
fs(x), which consist of independently chosen values over the range 0 to 1 at a spacing of
s such that fs(x) and fs(x + s) are independent and fs(x) and fs(x + s − ) are identical
for  < s. The information about a function contained in a given range by a particular
instantiation of the function is just the number of entries specifying the values of the function
over that range. Note that s controls the density of information conveyed by fs over a given
range of x. We assume that fs(x) is specified over the entire range of x from zero to infinity
so that the total amount of information that could be extracted from a function is infinite
for every finite scale. Figure 3 shows several functions and choices of receptor scaling in
cartoon form.
A set of receptors can do a “good” job in representing a function fs(x) as long as the
spacing between the receptors is less than or equal to s. With the simplifying assumptions
6One can argue for other ways to make the inference in this toy problem when αobs = 0. As long as those
depend only on the ratio ∆i+1/∆i and not explictly on ∆i+1, the conditions of the general argument still
hold.
7In this simple example there is a solution for values of αobs > 1/2.
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a b
c d
Figure 3. Cartoon illustrating the interaction of receptor spacing and function scale.
In each panel, the top curve shows a specific function fs(x); the functions in the four panels differ
only in their scale s. On the bottom of each panel, the vertical lines display receptor locations. a-b.
Constant spacing. When c = 0, the receptors are evenly-spaced, fixing a scale to the receptors. If
the function has the same scale as the receptors, as in a, each receptor captures a different value of
the function, the veridical region runs the entire length of the receptor array and the information
transmitted is maximal. However, if the scale of the function is larger than the constant spacing, as
in b, the array of receptors conveys less information because there is less information in the function
over that range. c-d. Ratio spacing. When c > 0, the receptors can extend over a much wider
range of x values than with constant spacing. The receptors carry information about the function
over a veridical region where ∆i < s; the border of the veridical regions is shown (in cartoon form)
as a vertical red line. As s increases (from c to d), the size of the veridical region in x changes,
but as long as the border is covered by the receptors, the amount of nonredundant information in
the veridical region is constant as a function of s. This property does not hold if the scale of the
function approaches the minimum receptor spacing.
used here, each of the non-redundant values of the function is captured by at least one
receptor allowing reconstruction of the function with error in the x location no worse than
s. More generally, even with coarse-graining and noisy receptors it is clear that there is
a qualitative difference between the ability of the receptors to measure the function when
∆ < s compared to when ∆ > s. Let us define the veridical region of the function as the
range of x over which ∆i < s. We also assume there is some minimum possible receptor
spacing ∆min. We measure the amount of veridical information I conveyed by the set of
receptors as the number of unique function values that the function has within the veridical
region.
Constant receptor spacing, c = 0
First, consider the implications of constant receptor spacing. If we knew the value
of s controlling fs(x), placing our receptors with constant separation ∆ = s would be
sufficient to convey all of the information in the function over the entire range of x values
covered by the receptors. N receptors would be able to accurately represent the function
over a veridical region of width N∆ and the amount of information conveyed about the
function in that region is just N . However, our constant choice of spacing would have poor
consequences if our choice of ∆ did not correspond to the world’s choice of s. If s > ∆,
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Figure 4. Information in the veridical region as a function of scale for three forms of
receptor spacing. The curve labeled c = 0 shows the results for constant spacing. This falls off
rapidly for scales larger than the scale set by the receptor spacing. Solid curves show results for
ratio spacing (c > 0) with a fovea; dashed curves show results for ratio spacing without a fovea.
N = 100 for all curves. See Figure 5a for an intuitive explanation of why the information decreases
for small values of s. The fovea has an additional 1/c receptors. Note that there is a region where
the amount of information conveyed is approximately constant as a function of scale before falling
off as the veridical region exhausts the number of receptors N . For c = .05, this region is off the
scale of this figure. Note also the error at small scales for c > 0 without a fovea.
the veridical region is still of length N∆, but the amount of information contained in that
region is only N ∆s , decreasing dramatically as s increases (curve labeled c = 0 in Figure 4).
With constant spacing, c = 0, the amount of information conveyed by the receptors depends
dramatically on s.
Constant receptor spacing ratio, c > 0
If we set c > 0 such that all receptors are placed in constant ratio the responsiveness
to functions of different scales is very different. Let us place the zeroth receptor x0 at xf ,
and the first receptor at x1 = xf + ∆min. Continuing with ∆i = (1 + c) ∆i−1, we find that
the spacing of the ith receptor is given by
∆i = ∆min (1 + c)
i−1 (8)
The position of the ith receptor is thus given by the geometric series
xi = xf +
∆min
c
[
(1 + c)i − 1
]
(9)
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Equations 8 and 9 show that when c > 0 the range of x values and scales that can be
represented with N receptors goes up exponentially like (1 + c)N . For a function of scale s,
the set of ratio-scaled receptors has a veridical region ranging from xf to
xˆs =
 s
1+c
c − ∆minc + xf s ≤ ∆N
xN s > ∆N
(10)
The amount of information present in the function in the veridical region is just (xˆs−xf )/s,
which is given by
Ic>0 =

1+c
c − ∆minsc s ≤ ∆N
xN−xf
s s > ∆N
(11)
The second expression, which happens when s is larger than the largest spacing among the
set of receptors, is closely analogous to the case with constant spacing (c = 0), decreasing
like s−1. However, the first expression with s ≤ ∆N includes a term (1 + c)/c which is
independent of s. The second term is small when s is large, so that for large values of s the
information conveyed is approximately constant. However, when s is small the second term
is substantial and constant ratio spacing (c > 0) fails to convey much information about
the function in the veridical region. When s = ∆min the veridical region includes only one
value of the function (see Figure 5a). The dashed line in Figure 4 shows the analytic result
when c > 0 and is constant across all receptors.
A “fovea” surrounded by a logarithmic scale
Note that if the ∆minsc term in Eq. 11 were canceled out, the amount of information
in the veridical region conveyed by the set of receptors would be precisely invariant with
respect to s over the central range. This can be accomplished by preceding the region
of ratio spacing (c > 0) with a region of constant spacing (c = 0). In order to equalize
the information carried at small scales, the region of constant spacing should have n = 1c
receptors each spaced by ∆min, as in Figure 5b. Adding a set of constantly spaced receptors
enables constant information transfer over a range of scales starting exactly at ∆min (flat
solid curves in Figure 4). When the region with ratio spacing starts at xf =
∆min
c , then the
region of constant spacing starts at x = 0. Note that the number of receptors in the fovea
is controlled only by c and is independent of the number of receptors in the region with
ratio spacing. The ratio of adjacent receptor spacings is constant within each region and
only fails to hold exactly at the transition between regions.
Discussion
Current technology is rapidly leading to a situation where we can design intelligent
agents. The results in this paper point to a design choice that may have played out on an evo-
lutionary time scale. To the extent neural representations of very different one-dimensional
quantities all obey the same scaling laws, it suggests convergent evolution optimizing some
design principle. One strategy that could be taken in designing receptor systems is to
optimally adapt the organism to the behaviorally-relevant statistics of the environment.
Evolution has certainly made this choice in a number of cases—the putative “fly detectors”
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c
Figure 5. Rationale for inclusion of a fovea. a-b. Functions are shown with different scales,
as in Figure 3 for logarithmically-spaced receptor locations. a. With a function scale that is much
larger than ∆min, several values of the function can be represented (here I = 5). b. When the
scale goes to ∆min, then much less total information can be represented. Here only one function
value fits into the veridical region. Note that the information conveyed by the same set of receptors
decreases as s decreases, as in the dashed lines in Figure 4. c. Schematic for notation for hybrid
neural scaling. The first part of the scale, analogous to a fovea, has n evenly spaced receptors from
0 to xf . The second part of the scale region, from xf to xN has N receptors spaced such that the
ratio of adjacent differences is 1 + c. The derivation suggests n should be fixed at 1/c, whereas N
can in principle grow without bound. If xf = ∆min/c, the scale starts precisely at x = 0.
in the frog’s visual system are a famous example of this approach (Lettvin et al., 1959;
Maturana et al., 1960, see also Herzog & Barlow, 1992). However, optimizing receptor
arrays to a specific configuration of the world comes with a cost in terms of flexibility in
responding to changes in the world.
Logarithmic receptor scales and natural statistics
In this paper, we have pursued the implications of a neural uncertainty principle—
maintaining maximum ignorance about the statistics of the world—for the design of sensory
receptors. Operationally, this means we have made only minimal assumptions about the
statistics of the functions to be represented, limiting ourselves to uniform priors and the
assumption of independence. Had we assumed a non-uniform distribution for the prior of s,
this would have required us to estimate at least one parameter. Similarly, if the successive
values of sx were not independent, we would have to have estimated at least one parameter
to characterize the nature of the dependence. It can be shown that the arguments developed
in the first section of this paper (“Optimal receptor distribution . . . ”) for uniform priors
also generalize to scale-free (power law) priors (see footnote 4). Much empirical work has
characterized statistical regularities in the world. For instance, power spectra in natural
images tend to be distributed as a power law with exponent near −2 (Field, 1987; Ruderman
& Bialek, 1994; Simoncelli & Olshausen, 2001). Similarly, it has been argued that power
spectra for auditory stimuli are distributed as a power law with exponent −1 (Voss & Clarke,
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1975). Perhaps it would be adaptive to design a set of receptors that is optimized for these
naturally occurring statistics (e.g., Wei & Stocker, 2012; Piantadosi, 2016).
Results showing power law spectra with similar exponents for natural images mask
variability across orientations and categories of images (Torralba & Oliva, 2003). For in-
stance, the exponent observed, and especially second-order statistics, vary widely across
pictures of landscapes vs pictures of office environments or pictures of roads. To the ex-
tent these statistics differ, if receptors were optimized for any one of these categories of
images, they would be suboptimally configured for other environments (Wei & Stocker,
2012). Moreover, because the eyes are constantly in motion, the statistics of natural images
are not necessarily a good proxy for the statistics of light landing on the retina averaged
by synaptic time constants. More concretely, the temporal variation due to fixational eye
movements has the effect of whitening images with conventional power law spectra (Kuang,
Poletti, Victor, & Rucci, 2012; Rucci, 2008). In the time domain, it can be shown that
in the presence of long-range correlated signals, logarithmic receptor spacing is optimal for
predicting the next stimulus that will be presented (Shankar & Howard, 2013).
A derivation based on a uniform prior is more general than a belief that the statistics of
the world should be power law. The former would apply across a range of environments and
equally well apply to any world with some unknown statistics. Moreover, the development
in the next section (entitled “Global function representation”), which predicts the existence
of a fovea under some circumstances, would be quite different if we had a strong prior
belief about the probability of observing a particular scale s. If the goal was to maximize
the information across states of the world, and if there was a non-uniform prior about
the distribution of scales, we would not have obtained asymptotically logarithmic receptor
spacing.
Specific predictions deriving from the approach in this paper
There have been a great many other approaches to understanding the ubiquity of
logarithmic psychological scales and the more general problem of constructing psycholog-
ical scales with well-behaved mathematical properties from continua in the world. These
are briefly reviewed in the next subsection (entitled “Placing this work in historical con-
text”) with special attention to drawing contrasts with the present paper. However, to our
knowledge, the predictions about the scaling of the foveal region are unique to the present
approach.
Asymptotically, a logarithmic neural scale enables a set of receptors to provide equiv-
alent information about functions of a wide range of intrinsic scales, implementing the
principle of neural equanimity. However, logarithmic neural scales are untenable as ∆ goes
to zero—the number of receptors necessary tends to infinity and the set of receptors conveys
less information about functions with scale near the smallest receptor spacing (correspond-
ing to the maximum resolution). In the absence of a fovea, there is a small-scale correction
(dashed lines Fig. 4). A region of constant receptor spacing near zero—a fovea—solves this
problem allowing the set of receptors to carry the same amount of non-redundant informa-
tion about functions with every possible scale ranging from ∆min to ∆N .
Equalizing the information across scales results in a fixed number of receptors within
the fovea. Critically, the number of receptors along a radius of the fovea, measured in units
of ∆min, depends only on c. The value of c can be estimated from noting the slope of the
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line relating receptor size to the center of the receptive field, as in Figure 1b. 8 Note that
the value of c is estimated from receptive fields outside of the fovea, whereas ∆min and the
number of receptors along a radius are estimated from information about the fovea. As such,
measurement of the two quantities ought to be completely independent. This quantitative
relationship constitutes a specific prediction of this approach and can be evaluated across
brain regions within the same modality, and even across modalities.
Placing this work in historical context
The present paper provides a rational basis for logarithmic neural scales and the
presence of a “fovea” for values of x near zero. It also adds to a long tradition of work in
mathematical psychology organized along several themes.
Measurement theory. Researchers in mathematical psychology have long consid-
ered the form of psychological spaces. This work has concluded, contra the present ap-
proach, that there is not a privileged status for logarithmic psychological scales. Fechner’s
(1860/1912) reasoning for logarithmic psychological scales started with the empirical obser-
vation of a constant Weber fraction and then made what was apparently a straightforward
conclusion: integration of the Weber law results in logarithmic psychological scale. That
is, the Weber law states that the change in the psychological discriminability ∆p due to a
change in the magnitude of a physical stimulus ∆x goes like ∆p ∝ ∆xx . Taking the limit as
∆x goes to zero and integrating gives a logarithmic scale p = log x + C. On its face this
seems reasonable; surely the psychological distance between two stimuli should be the sum
of the JNDs along the path between them.
Luce and Edwards (1958) noted that Fechner’s reasoning is not in general sound;
the integration procedure is only valid if the empirical Weber fraction result holds. Luce
(1959) showed that a logarithmic psychological scale is one of a class of relationships that
can map a physical scale with a natural zero (a ratio scale) onto an interval scale that is
translation-invariant (Stevens, 1946). Dzhafarov and Colonius (1999, 2001) developed a
much more general framework for constructing multidimensional psychological spaces from
local discriminability functions (see Luce & Suppes, 2002 for an accessible introduction to
the history of these questions) that also does not find any privileged status for logarithmic
functions. And none of these approaches provides a natural account for the existence of a
“fovea”—a region of heightened discriminabiligy near x = 0. To the extent that logarithmic
neural scales are a general property of the brain, the neural considerations described in this
paper provide a potentially important complement to measurement theory.
Recent approaches to Weber-Fechner scaling. More recently, investigators in math-
ematical psychology and related fields have also considered the rationale underlying the
apparent ubiquity of the Weber-Fechner law. These approaches have in general taken a
more restrictive approach than the quite general considerations in this paper. Moreover,
they do not lead to the specific predictions regarding the fovea derived here. Some recent
approaches have noted that if the psychological scale is designed to minimize a relative
8This prediction is at least roughly consistent with the trend of the hinged linear functions generated by
(Freeman & Simoncelli, 2011) shown in Fig. 1b, but this visual impression should not be taken as strong
quantitative evidence.
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error measure (Sun, Wang, Goyal, & Varshney, 2012; Portugal & Svaiter, 2011), logarith-
mic scales naturally result. For instance, in stimulus quantization, the goal is to choose a
discrete quantization of the stimulus space in order to minimize the expected value of some
measure of reconstruction error between the true stimulus and the quantized stimulus. If
one minimizes mean squared error, the optimal quantization is uniform. However, if one
attempts to minimize relative error, and if the quantization is constrained to have a fixed
entropy, it can be shown that the optimal quantization is on a logarithmic scale independent
of the input stimulus statistics (Sun & Goyal, 2011; Sun et al., 2012). Wilkes (2015) com-
pared the suitability of various relative error measures from an evolutionary perspective.
These approaches depend critically on the assumption of relative error measures, without
explaining why those might be desirable (other than that they result in Weber-Fechner
scales).
Other recent approaches that result in Weber-Fechner spacing make specific assump-
tion about the statistics of the world. For instance Shouval, Agarwal, and Gavornik (2013)
described the variability in perception as due to the variability in spike count statistics from
a neuron with some I/O function and Poisson variability. They concluded that the Weber
law is optimal if the world has power law statistics. Similarly, Piantadosi (2016) derived
a Weber-Fechner scale for numerosity under the assumption that the probability that each
possible number will be utilized goes down like a power law. This builds on earlier work
deriving a rational basis for power law forgetting on the probability of use of a memory a
certain time in the past (Anderson & Schooler, 1991). Wei and Stocker (2012) argued that
receptor spacings should be constructed so that each receptor carries the same amount of
information about the world. This depends on the statistics of the world and a logarithmic
neural scale results only if the world has power law statistics with exponent −1. To the
extent the world has different statistics in different modalities and different environments,
these approaches are limited in accounting for the ubiquity of Weber-Fechner neural scales.
The approach in the present paper is more general in that it does not make any strong prior
assumptions about the statistics of the world.
Universal exponential generalization. On its face, logarithmic neural scales seem to be
closely related to Shepard’s work on universal exponential generalization (Shepard, 1987).
If the mapping between the physical world and the neural scale is logarithmic, one would
expect that the mapping between the neural scale and the physical world is exponential.
Indeed, the approach in the section “Optimal receptor distribution . . . ” was very much
inspired by Shepard’s pioneering approach to the structure of an abstract psychological
space (Shepard, 1987). However, the results are actually quite distinct.
Shepard (1987) studied the problem of generalization; if a particular stimulus x leads
to some response, what is the optimal way to generalize the response to other stimuli in the
neighborhood of x? Shepard’s derivation hypothesizes a consequential region of unknown
size. Although the results depend on one’s prior belief about the distribution of sizes,
if one uses a Copernican principle like Gott to set the prior, one obtains an exponential
generalization gradient. The size of the consequential region in Shepard’s work plays a
role analogous to the scale of the function in this paper. And an exponential gradient is
analogous to a logarithmic scale.
The value 1 + c serves the role of the base of the logarithm in the scales derived
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here. This corresponds (roughly) to an exponential generalization gradient that goes like
(1 + c)x. In Shepard’s framework, the “space constant” of the exponential gradient is
controlled by the expected size of the consequential region, which functions like a prior
choice of scale. Note that the neural scales developed here would not lead to an exponential
generalization gradient around any particular point x. The width of receptive fields (which
is proportional to ∆) provides a natural lower limit to generalization. We would not expect
this generalization gradient to be symmetric in x (see Fig. 1a). Of course psychological
generalization need not be solely a function of neural similarity and is more difficult to
observe than receptive fields.
Neural scales for cognitive dimensions
The quantitative evidence for spacing of visual receptive fields is quite strong, due
to intense empirical study for decades (Daniel & Whitteridge, 1961; Hubel & Wiesel, 1974;
Van Essen et al., 1984). The derivation in this paper applies equally well to any one-
dimensional quantity over which we want to represent a function. If the neural uncertainty
principle is a design goal for the nervous system, it should be possible to observe similar
scaling laws for representations of other dimensions. As discussed in the introduction, there
is evidence that the brain maintains receptive fields for dimensions that do not correspond to
sensory continua. In the visual system, a neuron’s spatial receptive field is the contiguous
region over visual space that causes the neuron to be activated. Cognitive continua can
also show the same coding scheme. For instance, in a working memory task that required
macaques to remember the number of stimuli presented over the delay, neurons in lateral
prefrontal cortex responded to a circumscribed set of numbers to be remembered. That is,
one neuron might be activated when the number of stimuli to be remembered is 3-5, but
another neuron might be activated when the number to be remembered is 4-7.
Time cells fire during a circumscribed period of time within a delay interval. Each
time cell can be thought of as having a receptive field over past time. In much the same
way that a neuron with a visually-sensitive receptive field fires when a stimulus is in the
appropriate part of the visual field, so too the time cell fires when a relevant stimulus, here
the beginning of the delay interval, enters its temporal receptive field. Because different time
cells have different receptive fields, as the stimulus recedes into the past with the passage
of time, a sequence of time cells fire. In this way, receptive fields tile time, a continuous
dimension in much the same way that eccentricity or numerosity would be coded.
Time and numerosity do not correspond to sensory receptors in the same way that,
say, eccentricity in the visual system does. Nonetheless, the logic of the arguments in this
paper apply equally well to time and numerosity. Do these “cognitive” receptive fields show
logarithmic spacing? Although this is still an open empirical question, qualitative findings
are consistent with logarithmic spacing. Logarithmic spacing would imply that the width of
time fields should increase linearly with the time of peak firing within the delay. Although
a precisely linear relationship has not been established, it is certain that the width of
time fields increases with time of peak firing. This is true in the hippocampus (MacDonald,
Lepage, Eden, & Eichenbaum, 2011; Salz et al., 2016), entorhinal cortex (Kraus et al., 2015),
striatum (Akhlaghpour et al., 2016; Mello et al., 2015; Jin, Fujii, & Graybiel, 2009), and
medial prefrontal cortex (Tiganj, Kim, Jung, & Howard, in press). Similarly, logarithmic
spacing implies that the number density of cells with a time field centered on time τ should
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go down like τ−1. While this quantitative relationship has not been established thus far,
it is certain that the number density goes down with τ . This qualitative pattern at least
holds in all of the regions where time cells have been identified thus far.
In addition to logarithmic spacing, the logic motivating the existence of a fovea would
apply equally well to cognitive dimensions. This does not imply that foveal organization
ought to be ubiquitous. We would expect the size of the fovea to be large when c is small.
The cost of choosing a small value of c is that the range of scales that can be represented
with a fixed N goes down dramatically (Eq. 8). In domains where there is no natural
upper limit to x, such as numerosity or (arguably) time, this concern may be quite serious.
However, the cost of failing to represent arbitrarily large scales is perhaps not so high in
cases where there is a natural upper bound on the function to be represented. In the case
of vision, there is a natural upper bound to the value of eccentricity that could be observed.
In the case of functions of numerosity, the subitizing range, the finding that small integers
are represented with little error, may be analogous to the fovea. In the case of functions
of time, the analog of a fovea would correspond to something like traditional notions of
short-term memory. In any case, direct measurement of c, which can be estimated from the
width of receptive fields as a function of their peak, would provide strong constraints on
whether or not there ought to be a “fovea” for numerosity and/or time.
Constructing ratio scales for cognitive dimensions
Ultimately, one can understand the spacing of the retinal coordinate system, or other
sensory domains, as the result of a developmental process that aligns receptors along the
sensory organ. However, if these arguments apply as well to non-sensory dimensions such
as number and time, then this naturally raises the question of how the brain constructs “re-
ceptors” for these entities. One recent hypothesis for constructing representations of time,
space and number describes time cells—which have receptive fields for particular events
in the past—as extracted from exponentially-decaying neurons with long time constants.
The requirement for logarithmic neural scales amounts to the requirement that the time
constants of exponentially-decaying cells should be organized such that “adjacent” cells,
along some gradient, should have time constants in a constant ratio.
There is now good evidence for long time constants in cortex both in vitro (Egorov,
Hamam, Franse´n, Hasselmo, & Alonso, 2002) and in vivo (Leitner et al., 2016). The
long time constants can be implemented at the single cell level using known biophysical
properties of cortical neurons (Tiganj, Hasselmo, & Howard, 2015). Noting that a set
of exponentially-decaying cells encode the Laplace transform of the history, it has been
proposed that time cells result from an approximate inversion of the Laplace transform
(Shankar & Howard, 2013). The inversion can be accomplished with, essentially, feedforward
on-center/off-surround receptive fields.
The mathematical basis of this approach is extremely powerful. It is straightfoward
to show that the computational framework for a representation of time can be generalized
to space and number (Howard et al., 2014) or any variable for which the time derivative
can be computed. Moreover, access to the Laplace domain means one can implement
various computations, for instance implementing translation (Shankar, Singh, & Howard,
2016) or comparison operators (Howard et al., 2015). To the extent that representations
from different domains utilize the same scaling relationships, access to a set of canonical
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computations could lead to a general computational framework for cognition.
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